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EDF v. EPA: The Dispute
Surrounding Mining Waste Regulation
Under the Bevill Amendment
INTRODUCTION

The development of mining waste regulation by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) over the last decade and a half
has been a complex and troubled process. Since the enactment
of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA),I
the EPA, mining industry officials, and environmental groups
have struggled to assert their respective views of the correct
regulatory treatment of mining wastes. Particular confusion has
stemmed from the EPA's interpretation and enforcement of the
Bevill Amendment. 2 This amendment authorized the EPA to
study wastes from the extraction, beneficiation, and processing
stages of mining. Upon completion of the study, the amendment
directed that the EPA determine whether to regulate the wastes
as hazardous under Subtitle C of RCRA or to exempt them
from such regulation and apply the less strict Subtitle D solid
waste standards. 3 The dispute culminated in Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 4 a 1988 case in which the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld the EPA's decision to grant certain
mining wastes this Bevill exempt status. In that case, EDF challenged the EPA's determination on the basis that it was arbitrary
and capricious and inconsistent with the requirements of RCRA.1
EDF contended that the legislative history of the Bevill Amendment and the structure of RCRA itself clearly exhibited Congress's intent that the EPA's decision about proper regulation

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. 1987)) [hereinafter

RCRA].
Solid Waste Disposal Act amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat.
2334 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. 1987)) [hereinafter

SWDA].
I RCRA of 1976, §§ 4001-4009 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949).
4 852 F.2d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter EDF(I)].
I Id. at 1313.
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of the wastes hinged solely on whether those wastes were found
to be hazardous. The decision did not turn on the economic
implications of regulating those wastes. 6
This comment examines the development of mining waste
regulation under RCRA and other related statutes leading up to
the subject case. It continues with an analysis of developments
subsequent to EDF,7 focusing on the EPA's final ruling concerning the Bevill exemption status of several mining wastes.
Also included is a comparative analysis of the regulatory actions
regarding similar waste produced in gas and oil exploration.

I.

THE STATUTORY BACKGROUND OF THE BEVILL AMENDMENT

The federal government first became directly involved in the
regulation of solid waste when it enacted the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA) in 1965.8 SWDA was the first in a series of
legislative efforts that have resulted in a comprehensive program
for regulating solid and hazardous waste. The program now
includes SWDA, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976 (RCRA), 9 the Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments
of 1980 (SWDA of 1980),J ° and the Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984 (HSWA)."1 These statutes are collectively
2
referred to as RCRA.1
RCRA is divided into two major areas of regulation, subtitles
C and D. Subtitle C13 institutes a direct federal role in the
regulation of solid waste deemed "hazardous" by the EPA
administrator.14 It creates a "cradle-to-grave" regulatory scheme

6

Id.

EDF (I), 852 F.2d at 1309.
1 SWDA, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 997 (1965) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. 1987)); see generally Graham & Lopatto, Hazardous
and Solid Waste Laws and Regulations: Effects on the Mining of Coal and Other
Minerals, 88 W. VA. L. Rv. 587 (1986).
I RCRA of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. 1987)).
20 SWDA Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991i (1982 & Supp. 1987)).
" Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat.
3221 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-699i (Supp. 1987)).
12Flannery & Lannan, Hazardous Waste - The Oil and Gas Exception, 89 W. VA.
L. Rav. 1089, 1090 n.8 (1987).
11RCRA of 1976, §§ 3001-3019 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6931).
4 See generally Flannery & Lannan, supra note 12 at 1090.

1990-91]

MINING WASTE REGULATION

that controls the generation, treatment, storage, and disposal of
such waste. 5 The EPA administrator identifies waste to be regulated as hazardous under the statute by determining whether it
meets one of the four characteristics of hazardousness: namely
ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity and EP toxicity.

6

States are

given the option of operating their own program as long as it is
at least as stringent as the federal program. 7
Subtitle D,18 on the other hand, allows states to develop their
own programs, using federal financial aid and technical assistance, for the regulation of solid waste that does not qualify as
hazardous under the EPA's definition. To ensure sufficient stringency, Congress requires the programs to comport with minimum federal guidelines. 9 However, while the waste management
requirements under Subtitle C are independently enforceable by
the federal government, those under Subtitle D are not. Under
Subtitle C, the EPA administrator is authorized to bring an
enforcement action ordering immediate compliance and assessing
a civil penalty where it is shown that "any person has violated
or is in violation of any requirement" of the section. 20 Subtitle
D merely grants the administrator authority to bring suit on
behalf of the United States. Additionally, under the former
section, the violation must pose "an imminent and substantial
'2
endangerment to health or the environment." '

The most important difference between Subtitles C and D is
the scope of solid wastes to which the provisions apply. Subtitle
D regulates all substances that meet the definition of "solid
waste" under the statute. 22 Subtitle C regulates only those which
Id.
I5
6

40 C.F.R.

§§

261.20-24 (1989).

RCRA § 3006, § 3009 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6926, § 6929).
RCRA §§ 4001-4009 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6949).
RCRA § 4003 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6943).
20 RCRA § 3008 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6928).
RCRA § 7003 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 6973).
"Solid waste" is defined as: "any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment
plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded
material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from
industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities, but does not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or
dissolved materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are point
sources subject to permits under section 402 of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act, as amended (86 Stat. 880) [33 U.S.C. 1342], or source, special nuclear, or byproduct
material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 . .. " RCRA § 1004 (27) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 6903).
'
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fall within the definitions of both "solid waste" and "hazardous
waste" .23 The definition of solid waste specifically states that it
includes waste "from . . mining ... operations. '" 24 The issue
arises as to whether this waste should also fall within the definition of hazardous waste.
Mining industry officials have resisted the imposition of
stricter subtitle C regulation under RCRA because they believe
existing regulations adequately control solid waste in the mining
industry. 2 For instance, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA), in regulating strip mining and
the surface effects of underground coal mining, controls any
waste from those activities that constitutes solid or hazardous
waste. 26 SMCRA operates through the combined forces of the
Office of Surface Mining in the Department of the Interior and
federally-approved state programs. It imposes on mine operators
a complex and expensive permitting process. 27 However, SMCRA
still gives mine operators more control over their waste management practices than does Subtitle C of RCRA. The former
"affords the operator the flexibility to: (1) identify potential
coal and noncoal waste problems unique to the mining and (2)
fashion suitable mitigation and disposal strategies." ' 28 Moreover,
once state programs for implementing SMCRA are approved,
the state becomes the sole permitting authority and enforcement
becomes a matter of state law. 29 Enforcement under Subtitle C

23 "Hazardous waste" is defined as: "a solid waste, or combination of solid
wastes, which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious
characteristics may(A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality or an
increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness; or
(B) pose a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the
environment when improperly treated, stored, transported, or disposed of,
or otherwise managed."
RCRA § 1004(5) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6903).
14 RCRA § 1004(27) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6903).
See generally Graham & Lopatto, supra note 8, at 589 (citing Brief for Petitioner,
Mining and Reclamation Council of America at 30. Chemical Mfrs. Assn. v. EPA, 673
F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-87, §
701(28), 91 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982 & Supp. 1986))
[hereinafter SMCRAJ.
27 SMCRA (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1327).
n Graham & Lopatto, supra note 8, at 589.
- See SMCRA §§ 506, 510, 518(i) (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 1256, 1260, 1268);
see generally, T. SCHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW 539-40 (1982) (discussing
state preservation law).
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of RCRA remains with the EPA administrator. In essence, the
regulation of solid mining waste under SMCRA is the mere
"functional equivalent" of regulation under Subtitle D of
RCRA.30 It does not resolve the issue of whether mining waste
should be regulated under the stricter Subtitle C standards.
II.

TiE BEVILL AMENDMENT

In 1980, in the last stages of the recession, Congress passed
the Bevill Amendment as part of the SWDA amendments. 3 The
new sections were intended, in part, to address the EPA's lack
of information about the possible dangers associated with waste
from the extraction, beneficiation, and processing of ores and
minerals. This lack of information had prevented the agency
from effectively enforcing the existing regulatory scheme.3 2 To
address this situation, the Bevill Amendment created an exemption for mining waste. The Amendment mining waste excluded
from regulation under Subtitle C's hazardous waste standard
until at least six months after the EPA completed "a detailed
and comprehensive study" to determine "the adverse effects on
human health and the environment, if any," from its use and
disposal. 3 In addition, however, the EPA was directed to analyze the disposal methods currently in use and the availability
of alternative disposal methods, and to make a determination
of how the cost of these alternative methods would impact on
mine product costs.

34

Within six months of completion of the

study, and after public hearings and the opportunity for comment, the EPA was directed to "either . .. promulgate regulations under [Subtitle C] . . . or determine that such regulations
are unwarranted."

35

In proposing the amendment, Representative Bevill clearly
expressed what the focus of the EPA's considerations in conducting the study should be. The main goal of the amendment,
he asserted, was to encourage the development of coal as a

" Graham & Lopatto, supra note 8,
at 589 (citing Brief for Petitioner, Mining
and Reclamation Council of America at 30. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 673 F.2d
507 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).
11SWDA Amendments of 1980, § 3001(b)(3)(A) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6921).
31 See generally Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1309, 1310 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
31 SWDA Amendments of 1980, § 8002(p), (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6982).
Id. at § 8002(0 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6982).
" SWDA Amendments of 1980 at § 3001(b)(3)(c), (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6921).
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primary domestic source of energy by avoiding the economic
burden of Subtitle C regulation of mining waste. 36 He stated:
"Increased use of our Nation's coal supplies as a primary element in our effort to eliminate our reliance on foreign energy
sources is an option that we must exercise ... . We must provide
incentives, not disincentives, for its use. ' 3 The EPA's then
proposed plan for regulating mining waste under subtitle C
would have constituted instead "an unnecessary and ill-timed
regulatory burden." 3 The utility industry estimated that such
regulations would result in a one billion dollar increase in the
cost of producing electricity from coal in the first three years
alone.3 9 Because this cost ultimately would be passed on to
consumers, the result would be an inflationary trend that would
discourage the switch from reliance on oil to the use of domestic
coal.4 Representative Bevill insisted that he was not proposing
that the development of coal resources be encouraged at the
expense of the public health or the environment, but that the
required EPA study and the numerous other federal and state
programs for regulating waste would ensure that mining waste
would not go uncontrolled.
After numerous delays, the EPA, on July 3, 1986, released
its determination as required by the Bevill Amendment. 4' The
agency asserted that regulation of mining waste under Subtitle
C was unnecessary and proposed instead to regulate the waste
under Subtitle D's more flexible scheme.4 2 Specifically, the EPA
stated that its "current hazardous waste management standards
are likely to be environmentally unnecessary, technically infeasible, or economically impractical when applied to mining
waste. ' 43 The agency expressed doubt about whether Subtitle C
provided enough flexibility for the development of a mining
waste program that would address the risks presented by mining
waste while meeting the practical demands of mining operations.
Subtitle D, on the other hand, would allow the EPA to work

36

126 CONG. REC. 3361 (Feb. 20, 1980).

37

Id.

38 Id.
39 Id.

" Id.
4
42
41

51 Fed. Reg. 24,496 (July 3, 1986).
Id. at 24,501
Id. at 24,496
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with individual states in developing a program tailored to the
"specific nature" of that state's mining activities. 44 To ensure
effective overall regulation, the EPA promised to work with
4
Congress in expanding its oversight and enforcement authority.

III.

EDF v. EPA

In 1988, the Environmental Defense Fund brought suit to
challenge the EPA's decision to regulate mining waste from the
extraction and beneficiation stages under Subtitle D's solid waste
standards rather than the hazardous waste standards of Subtitle
C. 46 In Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, (EDF v. EPA),
EDF contended that the Administrator's decision was "arbitrary
' 47
and capricious and contrary to the requirements of RCRA.
It argued that Congress's primary goal in adopting the Bevill
Amendment was not to alter the regulation of mining waste
under Subtitle C, but to address the EPA's lack of information
about such waste. EDF further contended that the legislative
history of the Bevill Amendment and the structure of Subtitle C
clearly exhibited Congress' intent that the regulatory determination "turn solely on whether the section 80026 study revealed
that mining wastes are hazardous." How much such regulation
would cost the industry was not intended to be a factor for
consideration. 49 In support of this contention, EDF cited the
1984 amendments to RCRA Hazardous and Solid Waste Act of
1984 (HSWA), that, while authorizing the EPA to modify Subtitle C performance standards, would not allow the agency to
consider the economic impact of regulation in its determination. 0 EPA countered that its decision not to regulate under
Subtitle C was "a reasoned exercise" of its discretion to consider

-' Id.
45 Id.

,6 Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1309 (D.C. Cir. 1988) [hereinafter EDF(I)]. The EPA announced its decision in a "regulatory determination" published July 3, 1986. See 51 Fed. Reg. 24,496 (1986).
11Id. at 1313.
48 Id.
49 Id.

" Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat.
3224 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6901) (Supp. IV 1986).
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all relevant factors in making the determination." Moreover, it
pointed to the factors listed for consideration in section 8002(p)
of RCRA 2 as proof that Congress intended that cost be a
consideration. 3
In rendering its decision, the court asserted that the first
question to be answered was whether Congress had "directly
spoken to the precise question at issue." '5 4 The court relied on
Chevron USA v. NRDC 5 in holding that where a statute is silent
or ambiguous as to the factors an agency should consider in
making a determination, the reviewing court must only decide
whether the agency's determination "is based on a permissible
5' 6
construction of the statute."

Chevron involved a challenge to EPA regulations promulgated under the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. The regulations interpreted the term "stationary source" to allow states
in their permit programs to treat all pollution-emitting devices
within the same industrial grouping as though included within a
single "bubble. 5 7 Although the U.S. Court of Appeals set aside
the regulations, finding the use of a "bubble" concept inappropriate in programs intended to improve air quality, the Supreme
Court reversed and upheld the regulations. 5 The Supreme Court
asserted that the Court of Appeals "misconceived the nature of
its role in reviewing the regulations at issue." 5 9 Because the lower
court determined that Congress did not have a specific intent
regarding the use of the "bubble" concept in the permit programs, the only question to address was whether the administrator's opinion that the "bubble" concept was appropriate was a
"reasonable" construction of the statute.6 After reviewing the
legislative history and the language of the statute, the Supreme
Court found that the agency's interpretation was a reasonable
construction of the statute because it sought to "accommodate

" EDF(I), 852 F.2d at 1313.
of alternative
52 RCRA § 8002(p)(6) 42 U.S.C. § 6982(p) (1982), lists "the costs"
disposal methods as a factor for consideration.
EDF(I), 852 F.2d at 1313.
'
Id. (citing Chevron USA v. EPA, 467 U.S. 837, 842, (1984)).
" 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
EDF(I), 852 F.2d at 1314 (citing Chevron USA, 467 U.S. at 843).
5 Chevron USA, 467 U.S. at 837.
58 Id.

,9Id. at 845.
w Id.
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progress in reducing air pollution with economic growth" by
providing an "effective reconciliation" of these two goals. 6'
The court in EDF also relied on Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v.
NRDC.62 This case concerned a dispute over the agency's ability
to issue "fundamentally different factor" (FDF) variances under
the Clean Water Act (CWA). 61 Because the EPA often had little
information about pollution sources by which to promulgate
regulations, and could list only rough categories of these sources,
the agency developed FDF variances as a method for making
effluent limitations either more or less stringent for a particular
source. When the agency's authorization for issuing these variances was challenged, the Court of Appeals held that the ambiguity of section 301(1) of the CWA entitled the EPA's
modification of effluent limitation requirements to deference
where such variations were involved. 64 The EPA defended its
view by asserting that the section only prohibited modification
of standards applying to toxic substances which were permitted,
on economic or water-quality grounds, by other provisions of
the section.

65

The Supreme Court agreed with the EPA's view and upheld
its authority to issue the variances. The Court found that neither
the language of the section nor the legislative history exhibited
a clear congressional intent to bar the EPA from developing this
type of method for modification.66 Consequently, the Court
declined to "judge the relative wisdom of competing statutory
interpretations" where the agency's construction was "not in'67
consistent with the language, goals and operation of the Act."
Because Congress did not expressly list the factors to be
considered in determining whether to regulate mining waste under Subtitle C, the court in EDF had only to decide whether the
EPA's regulatory determination was a permissible construction
of the Bevill Amendment. 61 In finding that this was a permissible
construction, the court pointed to Congress' emphasis on economic considerations in the statute, as well as in Representative

6, Id. at 866.
62

470 U.S. 116 (1985).

61Id. at 125.
'

I" at 124.
ld.
Id. at 125.
/d.
I6

67 Id. at 134.

EDF(I), 852 F.2d at 1315.
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Bevill's proposal, as exhibiting its goal to "relieve the mining
industry of the onerous economic burden of stringent Subtitle C
controls if at all possible." '69 The court held that although the
1984 amendments made Subtitle C more flexible, it did not
narrow the discretion granted to the EPA by the Bevill Amend-0
7
ment to decide not to regulate mining waste under the Subtitle.
The court emphasized the deference it was required to give to
an agency's statutory interpretation unless that interpretation
was clearly contrary to Congressional intent. 7' It held that the
EPA was not required to make the determination that the court
or EDF considered "preferable. ' 72 EPA's decision must only be
found to be permissible under the statute as written and based
on a consideration of relevant factors and a rational connection
between the facts found and the choice made. 73 The Court held
that the agency's determination had fulfilled those require74

ments .

In a companion case, EDF v. EPA (II), 7 1 the agency's decision to withdraw a proposed reinterpretation and relisting (under
Subtitle C's hazardous waste standards) of six wastes produced
76
in the mining processing stage was challenged and struck down.
The court found that Congress' intent with respect to this waste
was clear-only those processing wastes which met a "special
waste" standard of high volume and low toxicity were to fall
within the Bevill Amendment. 77 Other processing wastes were to
be excluded from the scope of the amendment. 78 Waste which
did meet the standard would have to be made part of the
required study and either regulated under Subtitle C or, if that
was found unwarranted, under Subtitle D. 79 The Court held that
the agency had taken neither action.80 Under its proposed interpretation of the Bevill Amendment the agency excluded these

0 Id.
70 Id.

7, Id. at 1316.
1z Id. at 1315.
73 Id.
I EDF(I), 852 F.2d at 1316.
11 EDF v. EPA, 852 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied 489 U.S. 1011 (1989)
[hereinafter EDF(II)].
76 Id.
" Id. at 1327.

78 Id.
79 id. at 1330.

N Id.
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processing wastes from the study it made of extraction and
beneficiation waste. As a result of having withdrawn the proposed reinterpretation, the agency ultimately failed either to
study or exclude these wastes from the Bevill Amendment." The
court thus ordered the EPA to conduct a study of the disputed
processing wastes and to take proper regulatory action with
respect to them.8 2 In reaching its conclusion, the court once
again relied on the Chevron standard for judicial review of an
agency's statutory interpretation. 3 However, it found that in
this case, unlike EDF (I), Congress' intent was clear. Consequently, the court asserted that it was not required to give great
deference to the agency's decision. On the contrary, both the
court, and the agency, were obligated to adhere strictly to Congress' unambiguously expressed intent.Y
IV.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A little more than a year after the EDF decisions, on September 1, 1989, the EPA released its final ruling on mineral
processing waste regulation under RCRA. 5 The rule establishes
the final criteria the EPA will use to define "Bevill-excluded"
processing wastes by creating a bifurcated minimum waste volume limit for applicability of the exemption.8 6 The criteria fleshes
out the "special wastes" concept of high volume and low toxicity
87
wastes that the court in EDF (II) ordered the EPA to enforce.
Under the new criteria, mining facilities which produce at least
45,000 metric tons of solid waste or one million tons of liquid
waste a year may qualify for the exemption, provided those
wastes meet the low-toxicity requirements." This modified the
previous standard that defined the production of 50,000 tons or
89
more of any waste as high volume.

a' EDF (II), 852 F.2d at 1330.
82

Id. at 1331.

11 Chevron USA, 467 U.S. at 842 (stating that where Congress is silent on an issue
or their intent is unclear, the court must decide if the agency's interpretation of the
statute in question is based upon a "permissible construction.").
EDF(II), 852 F.2d at 1329.
's 54 Fed. Reg. 36,592 (1989).
Id. at 36,594.
8Id.

"6Id.
" Id.
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The rule also institutes a new pH, toxicity and mobility
testing method that low-hazard waste must meet. 90 Although a
representative of the Department of Interior's Bureau of Mines
stated that the test is an improvement over the one previously
used by the EPA, the Environmental Defense Fund has criticized
the test as much more lenient than that used for hazardous
wastes under Subtitle C.91
Finally, the ruling exempts five processing wastes from Subtitle C regulation pending a final study by the EPA and conditionally exempts twenty more. 91 The EPA has since proposed to
permanently strip seven of these latter wastes of their conditional
exemption, thus subjecting them to permanent Subtitle C regulation. However, there has been no final ruling on the-matter. 9
In a recent case, American Iron and Steel Institute v.
U.S.E.P.A.,9 various representatives of the mining industry and
the gas and oil industry brought suit to challenge, in part, EPA
regulations promulgated under the 1984 RCRA amendments
(HSWA). The regulations allow the agency to take corrective
action pursuant to the Bevil and Bentsen amendments to regulate hazardous waste." The EPA bases its authority to take such
action on section 3004(u) of RCRA which provides as follows:
Standards promulgated under this section shall require ... corrective action for all releases of hazardous waste or constituents
from any solid waste management unit at a treatment, storage,
or disposal facility seeking a permit under this subchapter ....

96

In its Final Second Codification Rule, 97 the agency interpreted this language to mean that it could take corrective action
against any solid waste management unit at a facility seeking a
permit, even if Bevill-Bentsen wastes were the only possible
sources of hazardous substances at that unit." Industry representatives argued, on the other hand, that the Bevill-Bentsen
Amendments prohibit regulation of these wastes under Subtitle

20 Env. Rep. 792 (Current Developments) (Sept. 8, 1989).
91 Id.
2

20 Env. Rep. at 854.
Id.

' 886 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
" Id. at 393-94.

RCRA § 3004(u), 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1982).
52 Fed. Reg. 45,788, 45,799 (1986).
" American Iron & Steel Inst., 886 F.2d at 394.
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C." Because the corrective action provision is part of Subtitle

C, it could not properly be applied to the exempted wastes.' °°
The court rejected the industry's argument, holding that the
Bevill-Bentsen Amendments do not exempt such wastes from the

corrective action provibion. The court rationalized that because
the provision applies generally to nonhazardous solid wastes, the
classification in which Bevill-Bentsen exempted wastes fall, the
provision should apply to these exempted wastes. The industry's

argument, the court stated, would work to "elevate Bevill-Bentsen wastes to a privileged position above all other nonhazardous
solid wastes." 10
American Iron & Steel Institute exhibits a willingness on the
part of this court to interpret the Bevill-Bentsen Amendments
more narrowly than it had in past cases such as EDF (I) and
EDF(II). By upholding the EPA's authority to take corrective
regulatory action against excluded waste that exhibits hazardous
characteristics, the court has impinged on the sweeping exemption created by the Amendments. This in turn has provided a
safeguard that will prevent truly hazardous wastes from avoiding
sufficiently stringent regulation.

V. TiE EPA's

REoULATION OF Om AND GAS PRODUCTION

WASTE UNDER

RCRA - A CoMPARATnvE ANALYSIS

While the Bevill Amendment exempted certain mining industry wastes from Subtitle C hazardous waste regulation, the Bentsen Amendment created a similar exclusion for oil, gas and
geothermal production wastes.? 2 The Bentsen exemption was
also conditional on the EPA conducting a thorough study to
03
determine the environmental and health effects of the wastes.'
After completing the study, the EPA announced its determination that Subtitle C regulation of oil and gas waste, like that of
mining waste, was unwarranted and that it instead would be
regulated under Subtitle D's solid waste standards.' ° This determination, like the EPA's ruling on mining waste, is consistent
with the recent trend in environmental regulation whereby agen" Id. at 395.

1w Id.

lot Id.
,02 Id. at 394.
103Id.
1- 53 Fed. Reg. 25,446 (1988).

JOURNAL OF MiNERAL LAW

& PoLicY

[VOL. 6:103

cies are attempting to utilize existing programs rather than implement new ones.101
In its regulatory determination on oil and gas waste, the
EPA stated that it would implement a "three-pronged strategy"
to control the waste: (1) improve existing federal programs under
Subtitle D of RCRA, the CWA, and the Safe Drinking Water
Act; (2) work with the states to improve their programs, and;
(3) work with Congress to develop additional statutory authorities, if needed.'0 The agency based its determination on three
basic findings made in the required study. First, because oil and
gas development occurs in such diverse ecological settings and
this waste contains such a variety of substances, a wide range
0 The agency
of management practices have necessarily developed. °7
found that in many instances, alternatives to these current practices were not feasible.1 8 Moreover, of the sites where damage
had occurred due to mismanagement, most were in violation of
existing state and federal regulations.'09 A second, related finding
was that existing state and federal regulations were basically
adequate to manage effectively oil and gas waste." 0 The agency
asserted that where gaps in state and federal programs are found
to exist, Subtitle D will allow enough flexibility to tailor performance standards to address them.'
The final finding on which the EPA based its determination
concerned the economic hardship that regulation would impose
on the oil and gas industry. The agency's estimates showed that
if the Bentsen exemption were lifted, from 10 to 70 percent of
large-volume oil and gas wastes and 40 to 60 percent of associ-2
ated wastes would exhibit Subtitle C hazardous characteristics."1
Subtitle C regulation of large-volume waste alone would increase
production costs by 1 to 6.7 billion dollars a year and would
reduce domestic production by approximately 12 percent."13 The
estimates showed that such regulation of gas and oil associated
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wastes would cost the industry between 200 and 550 million
dollars per year." 4 In defending its decision not to regulate these
wastes under Subtitle C, the EPA stressed that Subtitle C does
not allow cost to be considered in setting regulatory standards." 5
Consequently, it would not allow the flexibility needed to address
the economic impact on the industry." 6 The agency contended
that here, as in the mining industry, the added cost would
transfer to the consumer and ultimately would have a detrimental
7
impact on the national economy."
The fact that the EPA and the courts treat mining waste and
oil and gas waste similarly is exemplified by American Iron and
Steel Institute v. U.S.E.P.A."" The two types of wastes, and the
amendments which exempt them from regulation, are given almost identical treatment in that case. Any changes or modifications made in the regulation of one type of waste could signal
potential change in the other. Interested parties in either the
mining or oil and gas fields would do well, then, to keep their
eyes on developments under both the Bevill and Bentsen Amendments.
CONCLUSION

The Bevill Amendment has created a broad exemption from
hazardous waste regulation for wastes from the extraction, beneficiation, and processing stages of mining. Determining the
exact parameters of this exemption has not proven to be an easy
task. However, in the last several years, the EPA, with the aid
of the courts in cases like EDF (I) and EDF (II) and American
Iron and Steel Institute, has developed and defined manageable
regulations under the Amendment that achieve a balance between
the high cost of regulating and the importance of controlling
hazardous waste.
The courts, in turn, have developed a clear standard for
judicial review of the EPA's statutory interpretations. They have
handed down consistent decisions such as Chevron, and EDF (I)
and EDF (II) pursuant to that standard. These cases illustrate
that where Congress exhibits a clear statutory intent, the court
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will strictly enforce it. But where Congress does not clearly
express its goals in enacting a statute, or the specific factors to
be considered in carrying out the statute, the court will give
considerable deference to the agency's determinations and actions under that statute.
Finally, several trends in the EPA's regulatory decisions have
become evident from developments in the regulation of both
mining and oil and gas waste. First, the EPA has exhibited a
recent preference for improving and enforcing existing programs
rather than promulgating new ones. The agency also has shown
a tendency to take similar regulatory actions with respect to
waste from the mining industry and the oil and gas industry and
to interpret the Bevill and Bentsen Amendments consistently.
Yvette R. Hurt

